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Abstract
In this paper we study how access to bank lending during the recent financial crisis differed between family
and non-family firms. Our theoretical prediction is that the presence of a family block-holder in the com-
pany attenuated the agency conflict in the borrower-lender relation, because of the higher non-monetary
cost of default entailed in this type of corporate ownership structure. Because this information is to a large
extent soft, we further investigate the interaction between the family firm status and the screening tech-
nology adopted by banks. Using highly detailed data referred to Italy, we exploit the change in the credit
allocation following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. We find that family firms experienced a contraction in
granted credit lower than non-family firms. Results are robust to ex-ante differences between the two types
of firms and to bank-specific shocks. In line with our prior, banks that increased the role of soft information
in their lending practices reallocated credit towards family firms.
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21. Introduction
It is well established in the economic literature that financial frictions play an important role in determin-
ing business cycle fluctuations (see Quadrini (2011), for an overview). In particular, information asymmetry
characterizing the borrower-lender relation can amplify initial shocks by disproportionately affecting some
types of firms with respect to others, with significant real effects for the economy. In fact, as shown by
Bernanke et al. (1996), during a recession, firms facing high agency costs tend to receive a relatively lower
amount of credit, thus suffering a proportionally larger decline in their activity.
The question that naturally follows is then to identify which firms are more likely to be adversely
affected by the existence of such agency costs. To a large extent, this issue, despite the substantial amount of
existing research, is still open. Indeed, the standard flight to quality mechanism, describing the reallocation
of credit towards more creditworthy borrowers, is typically centered around the dichotomy small-large
firms. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) showed empirically that small firms suffered more than large ones the
consequences of negative monetary shocks hitting the U.S. economy in the early 1990s. More recently,
Khwaja and Mian (2008) found similar results by exploiting the consequences of negative financial shocks
in Pakistan.
However, we argue that other dimensions of firms heterogeneity, in addition to size, are likely to play a
substantial role in explaining the propagation of financial shocks. In particular, we focus on the heterogene-
ity coming from the corporate ownership structure, namely the existence of a family-block-holder within
the firm, to study how this interacts with the bank borrowing channel. By exploiting the Lehman Brothers’
failure in September 2008 as a natural experiment, it is possible to estimate how family and non-family
firms were asymmetrically affected by a common shock in their access to bank lending.
Our interest in the role played by family firms during a financial crisis is justified both theoretically
and empirically. Burkart et al. (2003), and more recently Bandiera et al. (2012), highlighted that family
block-holders attach a value to firm control which is not only represented by the monetary return of their
investment but includes also an an amenity component, that is utility gained by control per se. This amenity
component can be thought as the personal status acquired thanks to the identification of the family name
with the firm success, or as the desire to transfer the firm to descendants. Therefore it translates into higher
non monetary costs of default, that reduce the incentive for the borrower to stall resources at the expense
of the lender (thus avoiding the so-called the risk-shifting problem, as highlighted by Jensen and Meckling
(1976). The above idea can be summarized by the following quote by the family owner of an Italian firm:
“If the firm fails, also the family fails”1
1Translation from Italian. The original text can be found in the on-line version of “Il fatto quotidiano” newspaper, the 10th of
January 2012.
3Our argument is that the non-monetary cost of default attached to family firms, by reducing the ex-post
losses suffered by lenders, plays a significant role in explaining bank lending behavior. This is especially
true during a period of economic downturn in which firm profitability shrinks; in fact, this may induce
managers to undertake risky projects in order to restore the shareholder value. In a classical borrower-
lender agency problem (?) this implies an higher reliability of the family firms that translates into less tight
borrowing constraints.
On the other hand, as pointed out by Villalonga and Amit (2005) and Ellul et al. (2009), family block-
holders may have a higher incentive to extract private benefits at the expenses of minority shareholders and
creditors, because, differently from non-family block-holders, this benefit is concentrated in the hands of a
family. Moreover, because the crisis reduces the expected returns of investments, it could also exacerbate
the incentive to divert resources out of the company (Linz et al. (2012)). As a result, banks may be induced
to dry up resources towards this type of firm and reallocate them to non-family firms. However, as the risk of
failure is amplified during an economic crisis and could be exacerbated if resources are voluntarily diverted
out of the firm, we can expect that strategies not aligned with the objective of preserving the business are
less valuable for family firms.
Family firms have been extensively investigated in recent years. The reasons is that they represent a
widespread phenomenon all around the world, characterizing not only small and medium sized enterprizes
(SMEs) but also listed companies (see for instance Bertrand and Schoar (2006)2. As a consequence, their
ability to access financial markets has significant consequences for the real economy. We devote our atten-
tion to the bank lending channel because it is well known that banks play a crucial role in providing credit
to firms, especially when firms have no direct access to the capital market (in our sample, bank lending
represents 85% of total debts).
We investigate our research question by using highly detailed data which cover all loans granted to non-
financial firms by the universe of banks operating in Italy. This information is matched with firm-specific
data, including the identification of family status. These data enable us to include firms of different sizes
in our analysis, and in particular smaller ones (with number of employees between 20 and 49), for which
detailed information is typically unavailable.
We cover the time period spanning from September 2007 to September 2009, enabling a comparison
before and after the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and the contagion of the US financial crisis to European
countries. The choice of October 2008 as the identifying date of the financial crisis is driven by the nature
of the shock represented by Lehman Brothers’ failure. As pointed out by Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010),
this event was exogenous to the Italian financial sector and largely unexpected. Moreover, this event dra-
matically increased banks’ uncertainty on potential losses, and reduced their propensity to lend (captured
2In our representative sample of Italian firms, family firms represent about the 60% of the total population and about the 40%
of total sales in 2008.
4by the tightening of credit access criteria, periodically measured by the ECB Bank Lending Survey).
Our empirical analysis reveals that family firms, one year after the Lehman Brothers’ failure, experi-
enced a decline in the aggregate growth rate of loans which is both lower and statistically significant with
respect to comparable non-family firms, of around 5%. Results are robust to the inclusion of a rich set of
observable characteristics aimed at excluding correlations of the family firm status with confounding factors
and to control for possible differences in demand for credit. Results hold true also when looking at single
bank-firm relations, that allow to control for idiosyncratic bank shocks. We also show that this differen-
tial effect is not driven by the nationality of the controlling shareholder, nor by a different degree of share
concentration of family and non-family block-holder, but on the contrary to firm control by the family per
se.
Results are coherent with the interpretation that concerns about the reputation of the family have been
recognized as valuable by the Italian banks.3 In line with our theoretical prediction, they also reject the
alternative hypothesis that family firms could have been perceived as riskier by banks because of their
higher willingness to extract private benefits from the company.
Since our analysis focuses on bank-firm relations, we can also investigate the role of relationship bank-
ing during the crisis. In particular, we study how the asymmetric access to credit depends on the heterogene-
ity in banks screening technologies. To the best of our knowledge this represents a novel in the literature of
corporate finance, as previous studies on the relation between bondholders-shareholders are centered around
the heterogeneity from the firms side only. As shown by Fama (1985), banks have a special relation with
borrowers due to their access to “inside” information, whereas public debtholders must rely mostly (if not
exclusively) on publicly available information (balance-sheets, ratings, etc.) to make investment decisions.
This inside information is typically soft. Opposite to hard, it comprises qualitative information collected by
the loan officer about the creditworthiness of the borrowers which cannot be transmitted to other lenders and
thus is not verifiable by third parties4. Because the information regarding the non-monetary cost of default
is to a large extent soft, we can expect the differential effect for family and non-family firms in the dynamics
of credit to depend on banks’ ability to process this type of information. In other words, we can expect
the two dimensions of heterogeneity (the family firm status and the adoption of soft-intensive screening
technologies) to positively interact in determining an easier access to bank lending. Coherently with this
theoretical prior, we find that banks that increased the role of soft information in the lending technology,
after October 2008, reallocated significantly their credit towards family firms. We also checked and found
that for these banks the share of loans granted to family firms is not statistically different with respect to
3Our results are in line with previous evidence from a sample of US listed companies by Anderson et al. (2003), despite the
significant differences in the two samples analyzed (only 1% of the companies are listed in our sample), the time period covered,
and the type of debt contracts considered (bonds rather than bank debt).
4For a detailed discussion of the definition and relevance of soft information, see Petersen (2004).
5more hard-information based banks, in order to exclude the possibility of ever-greening practices (Peek and
Rosengren (2005)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: section 2 presents the data used for the analysis and
provides some descriptive statistics on the sample of firms under investigation; section 3 analyzes the trends
in aggregate granted loans, showing how they differ depending on firm corporate structure; section 4 looks
at single bank-firm relations, focusing on the interaction between bank lending technologies and family firm
status; section 5 concludes.
2. Data sources and descriptive statistics
For the purpose of our analysis, we exploit the information about bank-firm relations, firm corporate
governance, firm balance-sheet data and bank organization. Accordingly, our dataset results from four main
databases: Invind, Cerved, Centrale dei Rischi (CR) and a special survey on the Italian banks, run by the
Bank of Italy in 2009. Each observation is then represented by a triplet of firm-quarter-bank dimensions
over the period 2007-2009.
Invind is a survey conducted yearly by the Bank of Italy (Bank of Italy (2011)), on a representative
sample of Italian non-financial companies. It collected information on the variables concerning the family
status of the firms for three consecutive waves. We can observe the family firm status up to the beginning
of 2009 on the basis of the following question:
“Is the firm controlled (directly or indirectly) by a single individual or a group of persons linked by
family relationships?”5
When the information for a firm was not available in all the waves of the survey, we check the information
from previous years, using Amadeus and on-line search of the company’s websites. Amadeus is a European
database that provides qualitatively and quantitatively information on firm ownership structure. This ap-
proach to the definition of family firms, which relies on self-reported information, can overcome the typical
identification problem of measuring the stake of the ultimate owner in order to define firm control (see Ellul
et al. (2009)). Additionally, for a sub-sample of observations (industrial firms with at least 50 employees)
we are also able to quantitatively assess the specific distribution of the firm stakes between controlling and
minority shareholders, in order to measure how the degree of concentration of the controlling shareholder
affects firm behaviors.
In order to recover balance-sheet data (total assets, leverage, ROE among others), we used the the local
Italian Chambers of Commerce’s official information collected in the CERVED archives.
5Translated from Italian.
6We match our firm level information with the Centrale dei Rischi (CR) database, containing observations
on all loans granted by the Italian banking system to the firms, with quarterly frequency. This information
enables us to construct unique bank-firm relations for each quarter. We focus on revocable credit lines
only, due to the homogeneity underlying this type of contracts and because they can be easily renegotiated
unilaterally by banks.6 Thus, the loans under scrutiny exclude long-term, collateralized loans. As argued
by Sapienza (2004), borrowers may have contemporaneous relations (deposits, personal loans) with their
bank that could affect the lending decision and for which we can’t control by using the credit lines.7
Finally, we integrated the above firm-year-bank observations with the information provided by a special
survey conducted by the Bank of Italy’s regional branches in 2009 on about 400 banks, accounting for 80%
of outstanding bank credit to Italian firms. Crucially, this survey contains a variable referred to the change
in the use of soft information during the screening process, as a result of the financial crisis. In particular,
banks were asked, in relation to the lending practices towards firms:
“Starting from October 2008, as a result of the economic and financial crisis, indicate whether the
importance accorded to qualitative information and direct knowledge of the borrower increased, decreased
or remained the same”8
After removing state-owned companies and those firms for which we were unable to recover the struc-
ture of the corporate ownership, we were left with 1808 family firms and 1101 non-family firms (family
firms represent around 60% of the sample).
Table 1, panel A, provides a summary description of the characteristics of our sample of firms, where
family and non-family firms are presented separately. From there, we notice that family firms were much
smaller on average at the end of 2008 (a result well known in the literature), slightly older and with a
lower penetration in the North of Italy (and conversely a higher penetration in the South) compared to non-
family firms. Moreover, family firms are more indebted on average prior to the crisis, suffered slightly more
the contraction in sales relative to non-family firms and generated less cashflow for each euro earned (the
last two differences are weakly significant). Family and non-family firms, on the contrary, did not differ
significantly in terms of profitability as measured by the ROE.
6CR distinguishes between call loans and term loans. When call loans is granted, banks can call them unilaterally at any moment
in time, while granting term loans implies that banks typically have to wait the end of term before renegotiation occurs. Thus, when
using the term revocable credit lines, we are implicitly referring to call loans only, because lines of credit within the term loans
group are not considered. However, in order to be sure that results are not driven by the specificity of the financial instrument
considered, we also re-estimated all the empirical models summing together call and term loans. Results are qualitatively the same,
even if the inclusion of term loans naturally alters the value of the parameters of interest, due to the existing differences between
these two types of loans.
7Unfortunately, this information is never observable, and all the results must be interpreted under this caveat.
8Translated from Italian.
7Table 1, panel B, instead, provides summary statistics regarding firm-bank relations. From there, it
appears that family and non-family firms had similar risk profiles, as measured by the Altman Zscore9
(the difference in rating is statistically significant but economically negligible). In line with other works
using Italian data (Detragiache et al. (2000), and Ongena and Smith (2000)), multiple lending is a relevant
phenomenon within our sample, with more than 87% of firms having relations with at least 3 different banks.
Family firms have a higher average number of relations compared to non-family firms, and this result is in
line with recent findings by Guiso and Minetti (2010)10. This finding explains a different degree of loan
concentration for family firms, as measured by the Herfindal index and also as captured by the relative
shares of single banks financing the firm activity (particularly the first bank).
Insert Table 1 here
3. Bank lending and corporate ownership
3.1. Graphical inspection
In this section we establish whether or not firms suffered asymmetrically a contraction in the bank
lending, depending on their corporate ownership structure. In order to do so, we first look at the overall
exposure of the firms with respect to the banking sector, in terms of amount of granted credit lines. In
particular, we aggregate the multiple observations of different banks for each firm.
Figure 1 examines non-parametrically the bank lending channel by plotting separately the dynamics of
average granted loans for family and non-family firms. Specifically, we take the mean of the logarithm of
the outstanding loans granted to family and non-family firms in each quarter, from September 2007 up to
September 200911, and, to ease comparability, we normalize to zero the observations relative to the end of
the third quarter of 2008. The y-axis can then be interpreted as the growth rate of the outstanding loans
relative to that quarter.
Insert Figure 1 here
The figure provides some very useful information. First of all, it confirms that the choice of Lehman
Brothers’ bankruptcy as the identifying date of the credit shock in Italy was reasonable, as the average
growth rates in outstanding loans started to decline during the third quarter 2008. Interestingly, the figure
9This index, built on balance-sheet figures, can take values between 1 and 9. Higher values imply increasing probability of
default.
10They use concentrated ownership as a proxy for the degree of informational transparency and the debt restructuring costs for
banks in case of corporate reorganization. With both types of interpretation, ownership concentration predicts a positive probability
of engaging in multiple lending.
11In each quarter we excluded the first and last percentile of the distribution of the relative change in logarithm of loans, in order
to control for extreme observations.
8shows that after the sudden drop occurred in September 2008, the dynamics of granted loans for both family
and non-family firms remained stable up to the beginning of 2009, after which we observe a further and
steadily decline that continued for the rest of the period we consider.
Moreover, the difference in the growth rates of granted loans between family and non-family firms
appears to be insignificant both during the period that preceded the negative shock and immediately after
it, while the divergence between the two groups can be observed starting from 2009:I and it amplifies in
subsequent quarters. It seems that at the beginning the sudden and unexpected shock occurred with the
Lehman Brothers’ default did not affect differently the lending capacity of family and non-family firms.
The divergence occurs with some delay one quarter after September 2008.
3.2. Econometric analysis
In this section we test whether the different trends observed graphically can be simply explained by
relevant ex-ante characteristics that differed between family and non-family firms, instead of by a lower
agency cost of debt attached to family firms. Given the nature of the exogenous shock we are analyzing in
this paper, we refer to the theoretical prediction given by equation (1), and we estimate the following model:
4tlogLoansi = α + β0Familyi + β1Xi + i (1)
where subscript i refers to the firm, and Xi is a vector of controls. The set of control variables are meant to
capture possible channels which have been recognized as relevant by the literature in determining asymmet-
ric bank lending behaviors, which may be correlated with the family-firm status. Given that family firms are
much smaller on average compared to non-family ones, we include the log of size (expressed as number of
employees) at the end of 2008, as this may be relevant in explaining different accesses to the credit market
per se (the standard flight-to-quality).
We control for the geographical area of the firm’s headquarters by using three geographical dummies,
corresponding to North, Center and South of Italy. This is justified by the uneven geographical diffusion
of family and non-family firms: this factor may cause different demand shocks and different credit access
conditions due to the different distance between firms’ headquarters and their financing banks.
We also include the concentration of bank loans, measured by the Herfindal index and by the share of the
first bank, at September 2008, as these factors may also affect the capability of the company to substitute
across banks and consequently to hedge bank-specific shocks. For each firm, we construct the weighted
average length of the relation with its financing banks, with weights represented by the share of the single
bank relative to total borrowing (the length is relative to September 2008); in such a way, we control for the
average intensity of the bank-firm relations, which may not be fully captured by the Herfindal index. Year
of foundation, sector of activity, level of total leverage, cashflow over sales, borrower’s risk (captured by the
Zscore being greater than 5) are also included as natural controls. Finally, we include the change in sales
9occurred between 2008 and 2009 to control for any different change in the demand for loans that results
from a different impact of the economic crisis for family and non-family firms.
In order to estimate our reduced-form equation, our dependent variable is the difference in logarithm
of average granted loans in the two time windows 1st October 2007 - 30th September 2008 and 1 October
2008 - 30 September 2009. Within each of the two time windows, we collapsed all the loans referred to
each firm (recorded at each end of quarter) into a pre-crisis and post-crisis period. The two time windows
have the same length to avoid problems of seasonality, as loan applications may vary during the year for
economic and fiscal reasons. We have selected the last quarter of 2008 as the beginning of the post-crisis
period both because Lehman Brothers’ default occurred at the very end of the third quarter of 2008 and to
avoid to choose the time windows to compare arbitrarily. The choice of an observation period immediately
“after the Lehman Brothers’ event” helps us capture mostly supply-side effects in the dynamics of granted
loans, since credit lines respond rapidly to a change in bank portfolio composition. Our results are derived
after excluding the top and the bottom percentiles of the distribution of the dependent variable, to control
for outliers and to increase the accuracy of the estimations. Summary statistics of the change in log loans
are reported in the first line of table 2
Insert Table 2 here
Column (1) estimates the basic model without controls; column (2) includes the basic set of controls;
column (3) adds the Herfindal index of the loans concentration and the share of the first bank. Results
are shown in table 3.
Insert Table 3 here
Table 3 shows that family firms experienced a decline in the growth rate of loans which is lower and sta-
tistically significantly as compared to non-family firms. The coefficient is robust to different specifications
of the model, as well as highly significant and economically relevant. We notice that the β0 estimates in
column (1), without controls, and column (3), with the complete set of controls, are close. This confirms
that the observed differences in granted loans for family and non-family firms cannot be fully explained by
standard theories and require further investigation.
A higher risk (as measured by the Zscore) is associated with lower granted loans, as theory predicts.
Moreover, a higher concentration of loans, as measured by the Herfindal index, is positively correlated with
the growth rate of loans (even if not significant). However, besides this finding, higher ex-ante concen-
trations of loans with respect to the first bank (with highest share of granted credit) negatively affects the
change in loans; the two results together suggest that is the higher concentration with the first bank and not
the overall level of loans concentration to affect firms ability to hedge bank specific shocks. Size has a nega-
tive effect on the change in granted loans, seemingly contradicting standard fly-to-quality arguments which
10
predict the opposite sign. However, we cannot conclude from these findings that big firms are perceived as
riskier by banks. Firm size may capture other firm differences: for instance, big firms may find alternative
sources of financing more easily or be simply ex-ante matched with larger banks, that suffered the negative
effects of the financial crisis (see Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010)) more than smaller ones.
We argue that the estimated difference between family and non-family firms is mostly driven by a
supply-side effect. It is true that the change in outstanding loans derived from the financial crisis cannot
be directly interpreted as the effect of a credit supply contraction, but the coefficient β0 of the diff-in-diff
captures any additional difference on top of that observed for non-family firms. Therefore, the difference
between family and non-family firms can be interpreted as a supply-driven effect. This is possible, provided
that the two groups have similar trends in the demand for credit, after controlling for the set of observable
characteristics introduced in the analysis.
3.3. Robustness checks
So far, we have shown the existence of aggregate divergent patterns in the dynamics of credit between
family and non-family firms, after controlling for a set of observable characteristics potentially correlated
with the existence of a family block-holder and able to influence the dynamics of credit. However, some
concerns must still be addressed.
3.3.1. Foreign firms
The first relates to the foreign status of the firm. In fact, the large majority of foreign firms (they
account for around 8% of our sample) are controlled by non-family block-holders and, at the same time,
they may follow patterns of credit different from those observed for Italian companies. Foreign firms may
in principle substitute domestic with foreign credit, by exploiting their multinational group affiliation, or
may be systematically discriminated by local banks. In order to be sure that our results are not driven
by a difference in the nationality of the companies, column (1) of table 4 adds a dummy for the firm’s
foreign status to the full specification of column (3) in table 3. Reassuringly, our family dummy is still
statistically significant, even if the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly lower that before (the foreign
status is negatively correlated with the change in loans, but the difference is not significant).
Insert Table 4 here
3.3.2. Group affiliation
A second concern, partially related to the first one, arises because of the possibility for firms to substitute
bank credit with intra-group financing transactions. If group affiliation is negatively correlated with the
family firms status, then our results could be explained by a lower demand for bank loans by non-family
firms. In order to control for that, column (2) of table 4 includes to the full specification of column (3) in
table 3 a dummy to distinguish group affiliated and independent firms. Again, our previous results are robust
11
to this additional control and the group dummy has the expected negative sign, which is also statistically
significant.
3.3.3. Ownership concentration
Furthermore, we want to be sure that our results are not driven by a difference in ownership concen-
tration of the controlling shareholder, which has been recognized to play an adverse effect on the risk of
default (see Aslan and Kumar (2012)) and may vary between family and non-family firms. Unfortunately,
the information regarding the fraction of shares of the first shareholder is not available for the entire sample,
but only for relatively large firms (with 50 employees or more). This reduces significantly the number of
observations to less than half the initial size. Column (3) of table 4 adds the ownership concentration of
the first shareholder to the full specification of column (3) in table 3. In line with theory, higher degrees
of ownership concentration of the dominant shareholder reduce the amount of granted loans (even if the
coefficient is only weakly significant), but the existence of a family block-holder (ceteris paribus) reduces
significantly this negative effect (the coefficient associated to the family firm status is positive and around
6%).
3.3.4. Lock-in effects
The last hypothesis we want to test is whether the observed difference between family and non-family
firms can be simply explained by an ex-ante matching with different types of financial institutions. In other
words, because it is costly to switch banks, non-family firms might have been “locked-in” with banks less
willing to lend money during the crisis, differently from family firms. If this were the case, our aggregate
results could be explained by a different exposure of family and non-family firms to the financial crisis, and
our interest would then shift to understanding the optimal ex-ante decision of choosing some types of banks
with respect to others. In order to address this issue, we need to check whether family and non-family were
treated differently by the same bank. By using the level of single bank-firm relations, we can compare the
change in log loans for family and non-family firms, controlling for bank fixed-effects (this variable will
control for banks’ exposure to the financial crisis)12. Therefore, we estimate the following model:
4tlogLoansi j = α + β0Familyi + γXi j + f j + i j (2)
where 4tlogLoansi j is the log change in the average granted loans (the averaging procedure is identical to
the one used at the aggregate level) for firm i, with respect to bank j; Xi j includes not only the firm-specific
characteristics used in the aggregate analysis, but also the share of loans from bank j to firm i, relative to
total loans for firm i and the length of the bank-firm relation, both measured at the end of September 2008.
The addition of these two variables is important, as they control for very large percentage variations in the
12Summary statistics of the change in log loans at the single bank-firm level are reported in the second line of table 2.
12
dependent variable, induced by loans of small size. Finally, f j represents the bank j fixed effect. Results are
reported in column (4) and (5) of table 4. In column (4), we report the analog at the single bank-firm loan
level of the aggregate results presented in column (3) of table 3. Column (5) adds bank fixed effects.
The estimates of β0 in the two specifications with and without bank fixed-effects are almost identical
and very similar to those obtained at the aggregate level. They confirm that divergent trends in granted loans
for family and non-family firms are not driven by “lock-in” effects induced by an ex-ante sorting of family
firms with particular banks.
4. Heterogeneity among banks in lending practices
As explained in the theoretical section, family and non-family firms differ for the different value at-
tributed to the non-monetary cost of default, that can be valuable for banks, especially in a period of eco-
nomic turmoil. If banks are able to process this “soft” information, they may find family firms to be less
risky (ceteris paribus) and we should observe that credit is reallocated towards them.
However, the adoption of soft information in lending decisions tend to vary across banks. Berger et
al. (2005) show that larger banks prefer to reduce the delegation power of the loan officers, due to the
complexity of their internal structure and the cost of monitoring. This makes them opt for the so-called
“transactions-based” lending, that relies on the use of verifiable and transmittable information (the so-
called “hard” information). On the contrary, smaller banks may find it optimal to specialize in the so-called
“relationship lending”, which is primarily based on the use of “soft” information. Besides that, regulatory
interventions play a role in shaping the optimal mix of soft-hard information adopted by banks; for instance,
the Basel II reform in 2004 recommended to increase the adoption of standardized criteria for the risk
evaluation of company default (thus reducing the value attached to other criteria based on soft information).
The recommendation aimed to increase the transparency and comparability of national banking sectors. For
Italy, Albareto et al. (2008) show that models based on “hard” information were adopted by almost all larger
banks, as well as by the majority of smaller institutions.
The relative importance of soft information changes also as a consequence of the economic environment.
In fact, if there is a sudden shock to the economy, as the one caused by the recent financial crisis, the
informative content of transaction-based lending may be weakened: it relies on past information which
turns less powerful for predicting future outcomes. In this case, soft knowledge acquired at branch level can
partially alleviate this information gap, as it is based on frequent contacts with borrowers. This pattern is
confirmed by our sample of Italian banks: after September 2008 the relative importance of soft information
increased for more than 30% of them, while it decreased in less than 5% of the cases. Again, the degree of
such a change in the screening technology could depend on bank organization structure as well as on the
previous screening technologies adopted (in the extreme case, a bank that never processed soft information
before the crisis will probably find too costly to suddenly change its screening technology to incorporate it).
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Therefore, by exploiting the exogenous shock represented by the Lehman Brothers’ failure, we observe
how bank lending shifted towards family firms, as the importance of soft information increased. This
overcomes the problem potentially faced when using the ex-ante importance of soft information to estimate
the ex-post effects for different types of firms. In fact, as long as soft information was relevant also before
the crisis, so that family firms had already ex-ante an easier access to bank lending from ”soft-types” banks,
then one may not observe any significant reallocation of credit towards family firms simply because the
equilibrium condition did not change substantially as a result of the Lehman Brothers event.
On the other hand, by relying on a variable which is contemporaneous to the shock, we are potentially
facing an endogeneity problem, as the change in the relative importance of soft information may be driven
by different idiosyncratic shocks faced at bank level. In other words, if a positive correlation between the
change in granted loans and the change in the use of soft information were observed, we could not conclude
that the increase in the importance of soft information also increased credit availability for firms. This fact
could simply depend on the correlation between the evolution of the screening technology and the severity
of the shock hitting the banks. However, assuming that the effect of the shock is constant with respect
to firms characteristics, then we can consistently estimate the effect of the change in the adoption of soft
information for different classes of firms. This identifying assumption is similar in spirit to Rajan and
Zingales (1998), even if applied to a different context.
Therefore, we match the information contained in the special survey conducted in 2009 by the Bank of
Italy on banks’ lending behaviors at the firm-bank loan level, in order to assign each loan a measure of the
change in the relevance of soft information in the screening process. Our theoretical prior suggests that it
is the interaction of the family firm status and the increased importance attached to soft information that
determines a differential treatment with respect to non-family firms.
Figure 2 shows the trends in granted loans for family and non-family firms, separately for banks that
increased the use of soft information starting from October 2008 and for those that did not. In particular, for
each firm we aggregate the amount of credit lines granted by the two types of banks, and then we compute
the average log difference in each quarter with respect to 2008:III, for family and non-family firms. “Soft”-
type banks represent a non-negligible phenomenon13, accounting for around 37% of total loans granted to
the average Italian firm before the Lehman Brothers’ failure.
Insert Figure 2 here
By looking at figure 2 some interesting facts emerge. Firstly, as previously explained, the decision to
change the screening technology is likely correlated with the severity of the shock suffered by banks, as the
13We label banks as “soft” and “non-soft” banks for the sake of simplicity, but it should be kept in mind that we are only
measuring the change in the use of soft information, not its level.
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overall trends for “soft”and “non-soft” banks appear very different. This implies that we cannot draw any
conclusion on the effects of a more intense use of soft information on the lending decision per se. Secondly,
by comparing the relative adjustments for family and non-family firms in figures 2 and 1, we notice that the
importance of “soft” banks emerges in all its magnitude during 2009, when the aggregate trends in granted
loans are very close to the lending dynamics of “soft” banks.
We then move to the econometric analysis, in order to have a more accurate estimation of the effects of
the interaction between the family firm status and the banks adoption of soft-information intensive screening
technologies. In fact, because of the existence of multiple lending within our sample (more than 6 banks for
each firm, on average), we can directly account for differences between family and non-family firms which
are demand-driven, by using firm fixed-effects.
As a further robustness check, in order to be sure that our comparisons are not capturing ex-ante differ-
ences between “soft” and “non-soft” banks with respect to family and non-family firms, we also control for
the ex-ante intensity of the single bank-firm relation, captured by the relative importance of the loans of a
specific bank over the total firm’s borrowing and by the length of their relation. By doing so, we control for
loan-specific demand effects that may vary between banks for family and non-family firms, because of the
ex-ante differences just specified. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
4tlogLoansi j = α + β04tS o f t j + β1Familyi4tS o f t j + γZi j + fi + i j (3)
where 4tlogLoansi j is the change in log loans for firm i with respect to bank j; 4tS o f ti j is a dummy equal
to one if bank j increased the importance attached to soft information after October 2008; Zi j includes the
share of loans from bank j to firm i, relative to total loans for firm i and the length of the bank-firm relation,
both measured at the end of September 2008; fi is the firm fixed-effect.
The coefficient of interest is now represented by β1 that is relative to the interaction term between the
change in the use of the soft information, after October 2008, and the family firm dummy. This param-
eter captures whether the difference in the change in granted loans between family and non-family firms
varies across banks that changed the screening technology by increasing the value of soft information, after
controlling for any unobservable characteristic at the firm level, and for the set of controls specified above.
Results are shown in table 5.
Insert Table 5 here
By looking at results from columns (1) and (2), we see that family firms got a preferential access to bank
lending from banks that increased the importance of soft information (in addition to the average increase in
granted loans accorded by these banks). The effect is both statistically significant and relevant in magnitude
(around 8%). This is a direct test for the initial hypothesis that a credit reallocation towards family firms
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occurred during the period under scrutiny and that the change towards soft information-sensitive screening
technologies played a role in this respect.
We finally check in table 6 whether the preferential access to family firms, accorded by banks that
increased the importance of soft information, cannot be simply justified by ever-greening practices, due
to a higher ex-ante exposure of “soft”-type banks towards family firms. This concern is dispelled, since
the share of ex-ante credit granted to family and non-family firms is not different for the two groups (both
considering revocable loans only and the overall financial exposure). Family firms have a relatively high
share of total granted credit primarily because they represent about 60% of our sample.
Insert Table 6 here
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the credit allocation decision of Italian banks following the Lehman
Brothers’ failure. We have found that a relevant source of firm heterogeneity is represented by the corporate
ownership structure. In particular, the presence of a family block-holder has a positive effect in mitigating
the contraction in loans experienced by Italian companies after 2008. The result is robust to different
specifications of our empirical model. We have been able to control for ex-ante observable differences
between family and non-family firms and also to exclude the existence of significant “lock-in” effects that
could potentially reduce the capability of firms to hedge banks specific shocks, thanks to the highly detailed
data available on bank-firm relations.
Our findings relate to a growing body of literature suggesting the existence of an amenity value attached
to firm control by family block-holders. This idea suggests that the loss suffered in case of default is
represented both by money invested within the firm and also by the utility gained through control per
se. In the context of borrower-lender relations this translates into family block-holders perceived as more
creditworthy and reliable, because of the higher non-monetary cost they suffer in case of default. Given
that this type of information is to a large extent soft, we have also looked at how this reliability channel
varied depending on the type of screening technology adopted by banks. In particular, we have investigated
the interaction between the family firm status and the increased importance attached to soft information
in the lending procedure, following October 2008. We have controlled for firm fixed-effects by exploiting
the existence of lending from multiple banks and found that the family status positively interacted with
the adoption of soft-intensive screening technologies in granting access to bank loans, in line with our
theoretical priors.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Data construction
Centrale dei Rischi (CR) database records all the loans granted by Italian banks exceeding a minimum
threshold. The threshold is determined by summing up all the types of loans granted to an individual firm
by a bank, grouped into three main categories:
1. short-term lines of credit (analyzed in this paper),
2. collateralized credit lines, mortgages, etc.,
3. advances, etc.
The threshold changed over time: it was 75,000 euros up to September 2008 and then reduced to 30,000
euros. For missing observations we proceed as follows:
• when an observation for a specific line of credit at the bank-firm level is missing in some of the
quarters between 1st October 2007 and 30 September 2009, we consider the total amount of loans
issued by the individual bank,
• if the total amount of loans is above the threshold, we assign zero to that observation,
• if the total amount of loans is below the threshold, we compute its expected value (37,500 before
October 2008 and 15,000 afterwards) and divide it by three and assign the corresponding value to the
observation.
The inclusion of zeros poses a problem when we estimate the log difference in granted loans at the single
bank-firm level. We therefore exclude these observations from the sample, instead of arbitrarily changing
their values with a positive integer. However, the occurrence of these observations is limited both in terms
of number and economic relevance, as table 7 clearly shows.
Insert Table 7 here
6.2. Collateral channel
The observed differences in the change of granted credit between family and non-family firms could also
be the result of the different ability for these two types of firms in providing hard and verifiable collateral
to banks. Although our analysis is conducted on call loans only (not directly affected by the ability of
firms to provide collateral assets), some degree of substitutability with collateralized term loans could exist.
To overcome this type of concern, we validated our findings by re-estimating the empirical models of the
paper, using as dependent variable the sum of call and term loans. As already outlined, the estimates are
qualitatively similar and statistical significant.
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An alternative hypothesis is that a certain degree of complementarity could exist between call loans
and collateralized term loans. In particular, a bank may be more willing to grant call loans to firms that
already pledged collateral on their term loans. Given that we cannot insert the change in collateral for each
firm as regressor in the analysis, due to endogeneity, we address this concern by estimating a model where
the dependent variable is the time difference in the collateral-ratio before and after October 2008. The
collateral-ratio is defined as the fraction between the value of the collateral pledged by the firm and the total
value of granted credit (call plus term loans). Results from Table 8 clearly show that the family firm dummy
has no explanatory power on the change in collateral-ratio. This reassures us that the findings of the paper
are not driven by systematic differences between family and non-family firms in the change of collateral
provision.
Insert Table 8 here
6.3. Interest rate
In Table 9 we look at the cost of borrowing, to check whether differences in the change in (net) interest
rate charged to family and non-family firms exist. In order to do so, we exploit the information contained in
a special survey conducted by the Bank of Italy on a subsample of Italian banks (about 200). Unfortunately,
this comes at the cost of reducing significantly the number of observations we can include in our estimation.
Results show that interest rates went down in the period under consideration (most likely as a result of ECB
interventions in the interbank market), but no differences emerge between family and non-family firms.
Insert Table 9 here
6.4. Other financing channels
Given that family and non-family firms differ on average in terms of size, it is possible that the biggest
firms may finance their activities by directly accessing the capital market through equity or bond issuance.
Therefore, despite we already control for size in our analysis, for sake of completeness we estimate the main
model by excluding firms that in the period 2008-2009 proceeded with equity or bond issuances/payouts.
This is the most precise information that we can obtain from Invind regarding all the firms in the sample. We
find that 16% of the firms in our sample changed at least 0.1% of their external capital financing structure;
in particular the percentage of family firms is 14.5% while the non-family firms represent the 20%. By re-
estimating the main model of section 3, by excluding those firms that directly recurred to the capital market,
our findings are still robust; the significance and the magnitude of the family dummy is always strong for
all the specification of the model. This finding further reinsures us that the size of the firms is not the main
driving force behind our findings.
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6.5. Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Bank lending before and after the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy: overall adjustments
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Figure 2: Bank lending and heterogeneity in screening technologies
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the change in log lending
log(loans)09-log(loans)08: Mean St. Dev. Median Observations
aggregated at the firm level -.08 .42 -.03 2851
at the bank-firm level -.15 1.01 0 15212
log(loans)09-log(loans)08 is the difference in logarithm of the average granted loans in the
time windows 1st October 2007 - 30th September 2008 and 1 October 2008 - 30 September
2009. When aggregated at the firm level, it implies that in each quarter all bank loans for each
firm are summed, and then the ex-ante and ex-post averages computed. When considered
at the bank-firm level, it implies that, for each loan from a single bank to a single firm, the
ex-ante and ex-post averages are computed. At the aggregate level, we cut the distribution at
the 1th e 99th percentiles of the distribution to control for outliers. At the bank-firm level we
consider only those observations relative to firms analyzed at the aggregate level.
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Table 3: Granted loans and corporate structure
Dependent variable: ∆tlogLoansi
(1) (2) (3)
Family 0.0577∗∗∗ 0.0625∗∗∗ 0.0503∗∗
(0.0168) (0.0204) (0.0205)
log(Size) -0.0206∗∗ -0.0194∗∗
(0.0093) (0.0092)
Risk -0.0416∗∗ -0.0508∗∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0189)
Leverage 0.0110 0.0154
(0.0185) (0.0186)
% Change in sales2008−09 0.0584 0.0647
(0.0449) (0.0451)
Cashflow/Revenues 0.0121 0.0160
(0.0169) (0.0166)
Herfindal 0.2760
(0.1800)
Share first -0.5280∗∗∗
(0.1770)
Constant -0.1180∗∗∗ -0.2190 -0.1300
(0.0139) (0.8890) (0.8800)
Other controls No Yes Yes
Observations 2851 2026 2026
Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Leverage is measured at the end of 2007. Herfindal and Share first are measured at
the end of Sep. 2008. Other variables are measured at Dec. 2008. Other controls
include 11 sector dummies, 3 geographical dummies, firm’s year of foundation
and weighted length of the relations. For all the specifications we cut the 1th e
99th percentiles of the dependent variable to control for outliers.
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Table 4: Robustness checks
Dependent variable ∆tlogLoansi ∆tlogLoansi j
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family 0.0464∗∗ 0.0474∗∗ 0.0608∗ 0.0430∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0344) (0.0197) (0.0170)
Foreign -0.0404
(0.0569)
Group affiliation -0.0452∗∗
(0.0210)
Concentration -0.0009∗
(0.0005)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed-effects No No No No Yes
Observations 2026 2009 911 15212 15212
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. For columns (1) and 3: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Controls are those included in column (3) of table 3. We cut the 1 and 99 percentile of the dependant
variable to control for outliers. For columns (4) and (5): controls are those included in column (3)
in table table 3, plus the share of loans from bank j to firm i, relative to total loans for firm i, and
the length of the bank-firm relation, both measured at the end of September 2008. In column (4) we
compute robust standard errors clustered at the firm level, while in column (5) clusters are derived
at the bank level.
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Table 5: Banks’ heterogeneity in the screening process
Dependent variable: ∆tlogLoansi j
(1) (2)
∆tSoft 0.0995∗∗∗ 0.0642∗
(0.0353) (.0352)
∆tSoft x Family 0.0797∗ 0.0845∗∗
(.0424) (0.0420)
Share of the bank -1.0583∗∗∗
(0.0773)
Length of the relation -0.0094∗∗∗
(0.0030)
Constant -0.1804∗∗∗ -0.0530∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0240)
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes
Observations 12864 12864
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.∗ p <
0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Length of the relation and Share of the bank
measured at the end of Sep. 2008.
Table 6: Summary Statistics for Non-Soft and Soft banks
Non-Soft Soft Difference
Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Ex-ante Share to family firms (1) .613 213 .649 119 .036
[.352] [.326]
Ex-ante Share to family firms (2) .615 221 .648 122 .033
[.333] [.308]
∗: p-value¡0.10, ∗∗: p-value¡0.05, ∗∗∗: p-value¡0.01. Ex-ante means before Sept. 2008. The first
(1) row refers only to revocable loans. The second row (2) refers to revocable loans plus term loans
plus advances. Standard deviations in square brackets.
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Table 7: Comparative statistics for the bank-firm loan observations (euro)
Mean Median Observations
Before October 2008:
Bank-firm relations disappeared after Sept. 2008 247,692 11,267 458
Bank-firm relations considered in the analysis 710,715 100,000 19,722
After October 2008:
New bank-firm relations appeared after Sept. 2008 178,746 6,250 438
Bank-firm relations considered in the analysis 672,147.8 100,000 19,722
Figures refer to bank-firm loan averages either for the period 1st October 2007 - 30th September 2008 (Before
October 2008) or for the period 1st October 2008 - 30th September 2009 (After October 2008)
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Table 8: Collateral channel
Dependent variable: ∆tCollateral − ratioi
(1) (2) (3)
Family -0.0359 -0.102 -0.0822
(0.0636) (0.0716) (0.0727)
log(size) -0.0158 -0.0124
(0.0238) (0.0235)
Risk -0.0899 -0.0670
(0.0635) (0.0625)
Leverage 0.125 0.136
(0.0830) (0.0827)
Cashflow/Revenues 0.0175 0.0148
(0.0312) (0.0297)
% Change in sales2008−09 -0.0673 -0.0665
(0.0878) (0.0881)
Herfindal 1.246∗∗
(0.612)
Share first -1.028∗
(0.571)
Constant 0.154∗∗∗ -2.695 -2.700
(0.0524) (1.870) (1.865)
Other controls No Yes Yes
Observations 2851 2026 2026
Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Leverage
is measured at the end of 2007. Herfindal and Share first are measured at the end of
Sep. 2008. Other variables are measured at Dec. 2008. Other controls include 11 sector
dummies, 3 geographical dummies, firm’s year of foundation and weighted length of the
relations. For all the specifications we cut the 1th e 99th percentiles of the dependent
variable to control for outliers.
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Table 9: Interest rates
Dependent variable: ∆tNetinterestratei
(1) (2)
Family 0.0019 -0.0023
(0.0080) (0.0087)
log(size) -0.0098∗
(0.0056)
Risk 0.0051
(0.0108)
Leverage -0.00917∗
(0.00514)
Cashflow/Revenues -0.0013
(0.0010)
% Change in sales2008−09 -0.0132
(0.0119)
Herfindal 0.0327
(0.0773)
Share first -0.0440
(0.0764)
Constant -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.4100
(0.0067) (0.4550)
Other controls No Yes
Observations 998 863
Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Leverage
is measured at the end of 2007. Herfindal and Share first are measured at the end
of Sep. 2008. Other variables are measured at Dec. 2008. Other controls include
11 sector dummies, 3 geographical dummies, firm’s year of foundation and weighted
length of the relations.
  
 
